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Case No .. 7600
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH JUDKINS, DAN J. MILLER,
FRANK OBORN, and ARDIAN DE BLOOIS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
BOYD N. FRONK,
Defendant and Appellant
Respondents do not controvert Appellant's Statement of Facts as being inconsistent, but contend his statement is incomplete in many vital particulars and therefor submit their own Statement of Facts as follows:
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 16th day of January, 1942, the War Production Board was established by executive order by
the President of the United States and given authority to
allocate, ration and control the use of building. and other
materials, which were necessary in the carrying on of
war. (Fdgs. Par. 6) That said board was functioning and
its controls in effect at the time the defendant received a
building permit on June 7, 1945, to construct a store and
gas station on the property in question. That defendant is
a carpenter by trade and has been for many years and
knew, on June 7,1945, when he applied for a building permit, that there were shortages and a priority on building
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

materials and that there had been during the years 1943,
1944 and 1945. ( Fdgs. Par. 12 Tr. 65)
That the permit No. 3228 D issued was for erection
of a store and service station building 20 by 40 feet, valuation of proposed work $3,000.00, fee paid $6.00 (Fdgs.
Par. 10, Exh. G)
That the permit issued had written on the face thereof a provision providing in part as follows :
''And the said party is further notified and warned
under penalties provided by the Revised Ordinance
of Ogden City, that they must conform to all of said
ordinances, and all rules and decisions of the Building Inspector, and all work to be done in accordance
with the statement set forth herein and that no
changes in or departure from the general dimensions
or construction described above, and further shown
by the plans and specifications filed, will be allowed
without permission and approved by the Building
Inspector. This permit is void if work is not commenced within 60 days or if work is suspended for
60 days."
Also in effect at the time of the issuance of the permit
in 1945 was an ordinance which adopted a Building Code
which contained the following provisions:
''Every permit issued by the Building Officials under the provisions of the Code shall expire by limitation and become null and void, if the building or
work authorized by such permit is not commenced
within 60 days from the date of sueh permit~ or if
the building or work authorized by such permit is
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suspended or abandoned at any time after the work
is commenced for a period of 60 days. Before such
'vork can be recommenced_a new permit shall be first
obtained so to do, and the fee therefor shall be onehalf the amount required for a nev¥ permit for such
'vork, provided no changes have been made or will
be made in the original plans and specifications for
such 'vork; and provided, further, that such suspension or abandonment has not exceeded one year.''
(Fdgs. Par. 3, Exh. H)
That the Appellant began work on the premises in
June, 1945, and this work continued until March, 1946.
That at no time have there been any foundation concrete
poured for the building nor any construction of the station or store building nor use of said premises for the
business of a store or service station. No construction
work was done on said premises from March, 1946, until
October, 1948, (Tr. 61, 62, 63, 64) and work on said premises and building was suspended continuously throughout this period. (Fdgs. Par. 4) The Appellant bought
pipe in the summer of 1946, (Tr. 47, 48) but thereafter
he did not make inquiry for materials nor exert any effort to go forward with the construction nor do anything
looking to construction until he purchased two wash
basins and two toilets for the station in the fall of 1947.
(Fdgs. Par. 4, Tr. 62)
Appellant then did nothing on or off the pr~mises
furthering the project until his appearance before the
City Commission in October 13, 1948. That the Appellant failed to comply with the conditions prescribed by
the permit and building code designating time require-
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ments for construction. (Fdgs. Par. 4)
That prior to and subsequent to the lifting of priorities and controls over building materials on July 25,
1947, a great many people did find materials and did
construction work. (Tr. 73, Fdgs. Par. 13, Exh. I) That
subsequent to the lifting of controls on July 25, 1947, materials were on a "first come, first served" basis. (Tr.
70)
That while demand for materials exceeded the supply, pipe was one of the most critical-one of the most
desperate things-(Tr. 32, 36) and tanks and steel plate
were critically short. (Tr. 38) Appellant obtained both
of these items, pipe (Tr. 47, 48), tanks (Tr. 43).
That on October 13, 1948, Appellant filed an application with the City Engineer for erection of a service
station on premises in Ogden, building 28 by 40 feet, valuation of proposed work $8,000.000. (Fdgs. Par. 10, Ex. B)
fee specified of $18.00, was that for issuance of new permit. This application was denied by City Engineer.
(Fdgs. Par. 8) Appellant then appeared before Ogden
City Commission and requested that a building permit
which he purchased three years ago be renewed. Engineer
Kimball asked that the records show whether the permit
is renewed or issued in exception to the ordinance. Thereupon Mayor Peery moved as follows:
''Permit be issued to Boyd N. Fronk in exception to
the ordinance providing the property owners in the
neighborhood do not object within one \Veek. ''
which motion was seconded ~nd on vote carried. ( Fdgs.
Par. 8, Ex. C) That said motion did not require notice
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to property owners in the neighborhood and no notice
was in fact given them. (Fdgs. Par. 8) On October 28,
1948, the City Con1mission approved application of Appellant, (Ex. B) and permit No. 205-E issued.
That in August, 1946, ordinance No. 246 was enacted
by Ogden City making the operation of a store or service station on the Appellant's property in question a nonconforming use which o'rdinance is now still in force and
effect. (Tr. 3) This ordinance as enacted had no provision
saving the rights of holders of then outstanding permits.
That Appellant plans on erecting a service station
.. building pursuant to permit No. 3228-D or permit 250-E
and respondents seek an injuction restraining construction and operation of service station building.
ARGUMENT
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 1
The permit of June 7, 1945, was issued under the
following circumstances :
1. The War Production Board since 1942 had been
exercising control over building materials denying allocations of them for commercial construction.
2. The Appellant was a carpenter and knew there
were shortages of materials and a priority was necessary in ~he years 1943, 1944, and 1945.
3. That the Jlermit issued provided on its face that
it was to be void if "'~ork is suspended for 60 days. That
the Appellant undertook the hazards attendant on this
constru·ction with the knowledge that if he were not able
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to comply with the time requirements of the permit and
work was suspended that the permit would be void, and
rights under the permit lost.
Appellant cites 40

AL~

928.

The first paragraph of that annotation reads:
'This annotation does not include ... nor does it include the right to revoke a permit where the owner
does not proceed in accordance with the plans for
the permit.''
That Appelant failed to meet the conditions of the permit by suspending work for more than 60 days and more
than 1 year, and thus lost his rights under the permit.
In none of the cases cited by Appellant under Point
No. 1 does it appear that the permits issue~ contained
time and work suspensi_on conditions nor reveal a building code in effect providing that permits expire by limitation and become void if work is suspended for 60
days.
Appellant cites Trans-oceanic Oil Corporation v.
City of Santa Barbara, 194 P (2) 148. A permit was
granted to drill for oil. "It fixed p.o time as to when
work was to be commenced or as to when the work was
to be finished, its concluding sentence reading:
"Th.1s 1·1cense t erm1na
. t es -------------------------------· ___ ·----· "
The blank was never filled in. P 150.
In a written Memorandum of Opinion the trial judge
stated (P 152)
''That since the permit was silent upon the question
of how soon appellant was required to commence
drilling operations, it had a reasonable time in which
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to proceed . . . ' '
At page 156, the court said the license or permit ... is
itself the permission and contains the conditions with
which the permittee must comply in order to lawfully
drill, and at Pag·e 152 said:
'• If the permittee does nothing beyond obtaining the
permit or fails to co1nply with reasonable terms or
conditions granted the proper authorities may revode it."
The last case cited by Appellant under Point No. 1,
Atlas v. Dick, 81 NYS (2) 126 (1948) appears to have
been reversed on appeal to the Appellant division. See
86 NYS (2) 231.
The following are cases in which the permittee failed
to heed O_! comply with conditions of the permit and ordinances.
Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City and
County of San Francisco, 144 P (2) 4. California, (1943).
Rehearing denied January 13, , 1944. The defendant
passed an emergency ordinance authorizing the waiver
of health, safety and fire regulations pertaining to home
construction during the war emergency. The plaintiff,
under the ordinance, secured permission from the Federal Housing Authority to erect homes in a residential
area, acquired the property and obtained a permit and
prepared to erect 31 single family dwellings. On July 29,
1943, 27 permits and 4 others were granted to the plaintiff by the Central Permit Bureau and petitioner promptly started construction work, purchasing and moving
materials on to the property, hiring and assembling
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workmen and laying foundations for the buildings as
specified. On August 4, 1943, a home owner near said
tract took an appeal from the action of Central Permit
Bureau in issuing permits, to the Board of Permit Appeals. The Board affirmed the action of the Permit Bureau and petitioner continued its construction work. Protestants filed petition for rehearing on September 4,
which was heard on September 22, 1943, and on September 22, the board reversed its prior ruling and ordered
the cancellation of all 31 permits. The plaintiff thereupon took an appeal directly to the court for a writ of
mandamus commanding the reinstatement of the 31 permits and pointed out the expenditures made by him pursuant to the permits granted hiln.
The court, after discussing the propriety of the procedure by writ of mandate and the authority given the
Board of Permit Appeals pointed out the following language in the permit:
''This permit issued subject to appeal within 10 days
to Board of Permit Appeals. Incur no expense under
this permit until right of appeal had lapsed."
It also pointed out a provision of the ordinance providing ''permitting discussion by the Board of Permit Appeals.'' Despite the plaintiff's appeal that an emergency
for housing existed, that prompt construction work was
ncessary and funds ex12.ended, the court upheld the action of the Board of Permit Appeals in cancelling all of
the permits previously issued, discharged the alternative
'vrit and a peremptory writ was denied.
Also to Selljgman, et al., v. Western and Southern
Life Insurance company, ·Kentucky, 1938 126 SW (2)
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419. In this case the building inspector issued a permit
for a garage building on February 7, 1948, and work was
begun immediately. On ~farch 21, 1938, the building inspector issued a stop order, for failure to observe conditions in the permit, Re: Re-locate entrances, side line require!flents and architecture conformity. The builder appealed to the Board of Adjustn1ent and Appeals from
the stop order. The Board upheld the stop order, denied
the appeal from which order the builder prosecuted an
appeal to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court adjudged
that the building permit issued February, 1938, was in
full force and effect and the builder was authorized to
co~plete the building of the garage pursuant to the permit. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed the Circuit Court and justified the building inspector in stopping the work. The builder insisted that the building inspector could not lawfully revoke the permit because
large sums of money were spent in reliance on it: Authorities are cited on Page 425 of the decision. The Court
took the view that the builder did not acquire vested
rights which could not be lost.
Al~o

to State v. Turgeon, Ohio, (1947) 77 NE (2)
283. Defendant purchased real estate and on the same
day secured a business permit. An ordinance read in
part, ''After permit has been issued same may be revoked if work for such permit is not commenced in six
(6) months from issue." Failing to commence work the
city revoked permit. A new ordinance was enacted making business use non-conforming. Defendant filed application for second permit, was refused. Mandamus orderjng issuance of permit reversed.
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Also Vincent Petroleum Corporation v. Culver City,
111 P (2) 433, California (1941). Plaintiff spent $68,000.00 under a permit to drill for oil. ])efendant granted
several extensions of the permit, the last one up to May
30, 1937, on the condition the well be placed on commercial production before that date. Plaintiff failed to do
this, permit was cancelled.
In Godson v. Town of Surfside, 8 So. (2) 497, Floriday (1942) a permit issued with the condition imbedded
thereon ''that it might be revoked at any time upon violation of any provision of ... ordinances or change in
plans, etc.... '' Plaintiff began construction. Defendant
cancelle.d permit as completed building would stand partly within a prohibited distance of Atlantic Ocean in violation of city ordinance.
Harper v. Jonesboro, 22 SE 139, Georgia, (1894).
Permit issued on condition no obstruction or sidewalk,
nor covering requiring posts. Plaintiff failed to observe
and defendant revoked permit.
Publicity Leasing Con1pany v. Ludwig, 158 NYS
208 (1916). February, 1914, got permit to erect a large
sign. May, 1914, city adopted new ordinance limiting size
of signs. Plaintiff's signs were built at cost of $1300.00.
Expenditures did not create vested right, permit cancelled.
See Stringham v. Salt Lake City, Utah, (1949) 201
P (2) 758 where license reserved right in city to revoke,
which it did despite heavy investment in signs by licensees.
IN ANSWER ~rO APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 2
Re: Vested right not lost when national emergency prevented obtaining materials.
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The war emergency legislation which Appellant
clain1ed prevented hiln obtaining materials was enacted
in 19±2 and in effect more than 3 years before Appellant
made application for permit.
He was a carpenter and knew there were shortages
in materials and a priority necessary when he applied
for the permit, and before any money was expended received a permit which advised him of time requirements
and compliance with city ordinance.
That the Appellant acquired in 1945 steel tanks, described by respondents' 'vitness as ''critically short,''
(Tr. 38) and pipe, difficult to obtain. (Tr. 32, 36)
That after purchase of pipe in the summer of 1946,
appellant did nothing whatsoever looking toward construction until two toilets and wash basins were bought
in the fall of 1947, and then nothing whatsoever again
until application for a new permit October 13, 1948. Par.
13 of Findings and Exh. I, show commercial construction that was completed before and after priorities were
lifted. Those completed after July 25, 1947, were finished
when materials were on a ''first come; first served''
basis. ( Tr. 70)
Authority cited by Appellant, National Yeast Corporation v. City of Crystal Lake (Page 11 of Appellant's
brief) concerned an agreement made November 10, 1939,
for conditions of renewa] of an option in 1944. Parties
were entitled to relief as war conditions could not have
been anticipated in 1939.
Under facts of present case, material, controls and
shortages were existing when permit issued and project
was undertaken. Neither war, emergency legislation nor
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shortages wer~ unexpected conditions which prevented
construction.
In National.Lumber Products Company vs. Ponzio,
New Jersey, (1945) 42 A (2). 753, plaintiff claimed undue
hardship as he was engaged in fulfilling a war contract
and sought exception to the zoni~~ requirements. At page
756 court observes that plaintiff undertook war work
with full knowledge of its equipment on hand and knew,
or was charged with knowing, he could not enlarge the
non-conforming use. Despite such factual and legal
knowledge plaintiff apparently chose to take a chance
and installed its equipment.
War emergencies no justification for suspending op ..
eration of ordinance.
Wilkins v. San Bernardino, et al, Calif. (1946) 175
p (2) 542.
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT NO. :3
City had power to renew ...
Respondents' Point A is that Board of City Commission had no authority to grant exception to ordinance
by renewing permit or otherwise, and reference is made
to Point A for further response to Appellant's Point No.

3.
Ordinance 246 made service station at Appellant's
lot a non-conforming use; any action by City Commis::non by re~olution or otherwisf\ to vary ordinance would
be illegal.
Function of Board of Examiners and Appeals re-12-
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ferred to by Appellant on Page 13 of brief, was to determine suitability of alternate materials and types of
construction. (Fdgs. Par. 11) No authority to renew permits, override Building Inspector's denial of permit nor
authorize issuance of permit tor non-conforming use was
among powers granted and if City Commission was acting for Board of Examiners and Appeals as Appellant
suggests on Page 13, it would be limited to determining
alternate materials.
The City Comnrission, by Ordinance 144, adopting
a buildi~g code fixed the conditions for loss of permit
and issuance of a new permit. (Fdgs. Par. 3) Old permit
expired by limitation if work suspended for 60 days. Before work could be recommended a new permit had to be
obtained issuable on payment of one-half fee providing:
A.

No changes in plans and specifications.

B. That suspension had not exceeded one year.
Application failed to qualify on both conditions, having
changed the plans and specifications, (Fdgs. Par. 10) and
having suspended work more than 1 year. (Fdgs. Par. 4.
Cone. Par. 6)

Giordano v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Dumont, New Jersey, (1948) 61 A (2) 245. The plaintiff
failed to commence work in 1 year as permit required.
Thereafter enactment of an ordinance making the use
non-conforming, obtained a second permit and claimed it
was an extension of the first permit. The lower court held
that appellant obtained an extension of his permit, but
the court of Errors and Appeals held at Page 246 that
the first permit expired by its own limitation and having
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thus expired. was not susceptible of extension or -renewal after its expiration.
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 4
Abandonment is made up of act and intent, Vol. I,
Words and Phrases, Page 39., Peal vs. Gulf Red Cedar
Company of California, Calif., (1936) 59 P (2) 183, and
intent must be gathered from facts and circumstances of
the case.
A matter of intent should be determined by the
Court in its conclusions. The Court found in Paragraph
4 of Findings that Appellant failed to comply with time
requirements of permit, that a great many people did
find materials and did construction. Paragraph 12 of
Findings and Appellant's testimony showed he made
no inquiry for materials, even after lifting of priorities
and materials were on a ''first come, first served basis."
The Court properly concluded the Appellant abandoned
the construction.
Whether the Appellant abandoned the construction
or not is not vital in this case, as the conditions of the
permit did not require abandonment for permit to be
void, only suspension of work (Exhibit A, Findings Par.
3) and Building Code specified suspension or abandonment to void permit.
RESPONDENTS' POINT NO. A
CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE PERMIT
"IN EXCEPTION TO ORDINANCE," OR G~ANT
. RENEWAL OF PERMIT, AND CITY COM1IISSION
ACTED ILLEGALLY IN ATTEMPTING TO DO SO.
-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cities and towns received po,ver to enact ordinances
regulating zoning by Title 15, Article 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. Section 15-8-95 provides for the appointment of a Board of Adjustment, Section 15-8-101, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, provides in part as _follows:
' ~ ( 2) To hear and decide special exceptions to the
terms of the ordinance upon which such board is required to pass under such ordinance. (3) To authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship; PROVIDED, that the
spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done.''
Pursuant to these sections Ogden City enacted its ordinance No. 41-17, Board of Adjustment, which ordinance
is attached to the complaint herein and by reference
made a part thereof. That ordinance reads in part as
follows:
"Said board shall adopt rules, subject to the provisions of the laws of the State of Utah in such case
made and provided, for the regulation of its procedure and conduct of its duties and shall have power
to hear and decide special exceptions to the terms
of this ordinance in specific cases where a variance
from the terms of this ordinance will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to special
conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions
of the ordinance will result in any unnecessary hardship ... " (Complaint 016, and Tr. 3)
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The Appellant here made no appeal to the Board
of Adjustment but made his request directly to the City
Commission. That the governing body of the city is without authority to grant an exception to an ordinance· is
held in the following cases :
In Lynch v. The Burough of Hillsdale, et al, in the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, (1947) 54 A (2) 723, the
governing body of the Burough of Hillsdale adopted a
resolution purporting to grant to the defendant permission to ''change the use'' of a building to a .non-conforming use in violation of an existing ordinance. The property owner alleges that said governing body ''can do by
resolution whatever the Board of Adjustment is authorized to do.'' The court rejects this contention and states
as follows:
''The determination of the question of variance and
special exceptions has been confined by the legisla. ture to the specialized judgment of the zoning
board.''
The action of the governing body in attempting to grant
an exception to the ordinance was a wholly ineffective
exercise of the local legislative power.
As stated in Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co.,
97 Utah 249, 92 ~Pacific (2) 724. Our Supreme Court
stated as follows:
The municipality is a creation, a creature of the
legislature. It has only such powers as are granted
to it by the state and such as are necessary are reasonably implied to enable it to perform the duties and
functions and exercise the privileges conferred upon
it.
-16-
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Authority to grant exceptions to the ordinance was extended by the Utah State Legislature and by city ordinance only to the Board of Adjustment.
Chicago Railroad v. the City of Chicago, Ill., (1898)
51 N. E. 596. City ordinance required certain grade in
the streets. The City Council, by resolution, sought to
vary the requirements of the ordinance. The court holding their action void stated the ordinance cannot be
amended, repealed or suspended by a resolution. The
action which modifies or suspends the ordinance must
be one of equal dignity.
In County Commissioners of Anne .Arundell County
v. Herbert S. Ward, Maryland Court of Appeals (April
1946) 165 ALR 816, 46 A (2) 684. The Board of County
Commissioners, as an administrative body, was bound
to follow the regulations it adopted, in the exercise of its
delegated legislative power. The fact that it might have
re-zoned the area, upon due notice and after hearing, does
not alter its obligation to adhere to existing regulations,
or authorize it to make special exceptions in individual
cases. Chayt v. Zoning Appeal Board, 177 Md 426 9 A (2)
747, and cases cited; Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist
Protestant Church, 164 Md 487, 165 A 703. Compare
County Commissioners of Prince George's County v. N.
W. Cemetery Co., 160 Md 653, 154 A 452, and Gordon v.
Commissioners of Montgomery Co., 164 Md 210, 164 A
676.
In the case of Potts v. Board of Adjustment, (1945)
133 NJL, 230, 43 A (2) 850 the Court said:
Equality and uniformity of operation within the
particular zone, as respects each class and kind of
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buildings, are basic in the statute. Insidious distinctions and discriminations are inadmissible. The essence of zoning is territorial division according to
the character of the lands and structures and their
'peculiar suitability' for particular uses, among
others, and uniformity of use within the division.'~
In Beem v.' Davis, Idaho (1918) 175 P 959, the trus .
tees of Twin Falls, Idaho undertook to suspend the operation of the ordinance to permit the erection of a building
and such action was held to be illegal and beyond their
authority.
Two cases hold City Council may not grant an exception to an ordinance even by the enactment of a new
ordinance for that particular purpose, are:
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Boyd, 62 A
( 2) 588 (1948). Ordinance No. 1247 provided in paragraph No. 34 that a filling station should be permitted
only by authority of public ordinance, and thereunder
numerous ordinances were passed permitting the erection of filling stations. This method was subsequently
abandoned and by Ordinance No. 318 the Board of Zoning Appeals was given authority to pass. upon applications for permits for filling station. That their action
was limited by a proviso prohibiting the filling station
within three hundred feet of a theatre.
The Mayor and City Councilpassed Ordinance No.
117 by which they attempted to waive the provisions of
paragraph 34 of Ordinance No. 247 as amended by Ordinance No. 318, to permit the erection of a filling station
within three hundred feet of a 1notion picture theatre.
-18-.
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Under head notes 2-5 at Page 590 the Court says:
''The broad question in this case is how far the
Mayor and City Council may make special exceptions to the Zoning Ordinance. The narrow question
is whether their action in passing Ordinance No.
117 is a valid exception of such power as they may
have to make exceptions.
Zoning is an exercise of the police power which, for
the public good, takes away some of the rights of
individuals to use their property as they please and
at the same time gives them rights to restrict injurious uses of the property of others. This cannot
be done by piecemeal legislation. It can only be upheld as part of the general plan for a community
which sets apart certain areas for residence purposes and permits commercial business in other
areas where it is established or where such use is
obviously suitable.''
The Baltimore City Court's action reversing the board's
order was affirmed.
and
See Cassel v. Maxor and City Council of Baltimore,
73 A (2) 486. Page 488.
·
The Appellant's second application for a permit in
October, 1948, was denied by the City Engineer who at
his appearance before the City Commission was asked
whether or not he had any personal objections to the permit to which the Engineer replied asking that the records
show whether the permit is renewed or issued in exception to the ordinance. Whereupon it was moved and seconded that the permit be issued in exception to the ordinance. (Fdgs Par. 8, Exh. C) The action thus taken by the
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City Commission was illegal and beyond their author..
ity.
See Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co. 97 Utah
249, at Page 256.
RESPONDENTS' POINT B
THE CITY WAS ACTING WITHIN ITS POLICE
POWERS IN iMPOSING CONDITIONS IN PERMITS
ISSUED AND FAILURE TO MEET THOSE CONDITIONS RENDERED PERMIT VOID.
The permit issued June 7, 1945, (Exh. A) advised
the permittee that he must conform with all ordinances
and that the permit would be void if the work was suspended for 60 days. A building code also made the permit void if work was suspended for 60 days and fixed the
conditions for recommencing the work. (Fdgs. Par. 3,
Exh.· H)
Cases dealing with conditions and time requirements
and expiration of permits are as follows:
Giordano v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Dumont, New Jersey, (1948) 61 A (2) 245. Plaintiff in the
early part of 1945 acquired title to a plot of ground and
on June 19, 1945, obtained building permit to erect a
gasoline station thereon. The building code provided,
inter alia, that "any permits which may be issued by the
building inspector ... under which no work is commenced
within one year from the time of the issuance shall expire at the end of that time." For more than one year
after permit 'vas issued no work was done toward erection or construction of gasoline station, so under the
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building code the building permit expired. On July 8,
1946, the defendants amended the zoning ordinance to
prohibit filling stations on the plaintiff's premises, and
five months after the adoption of the new ordinance the
plaintiff applied for and had issued to him a building
permit to erect a gasoline station on the same premises .
. A_ new building inspector took office January 1, 1947,
and caused letters to be addressed to the plaintiff stating the permit had been issued contrary to the amended
ordinance and was revoked. The court below held that
the appellant obtained an extension of his building permit and appellant argues that the second permit was an
extension or renewal of the first E_ermit. The proofs do
not disclose any written application for either building
permit, although two permits are sho,vn, No. 3253 issued
on June 19, 1945, and No. 3686 issued on December 9,
1946. In the latter permit there is no mention of its being
an extension or renewal of the first permit. The appellant concedes that no work had been commenced within
one year from June 19,-1945, the date of issuance of the
first permit; it therefore expired by its own limitation
and, having thus expired, was not susceptible of extension or renewal after its expiration. According, we do
not agree that the second permit was an extension or renewal of the first permit.
The lower court's action in upholding the revocation
of the permit was affirmed in this appeal.
In Sun Oil Co .. v. Borough of Bradley Beach, Supreme Court of New Jersey, (1947) 55 A (2) 778. March,
1945, the plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase
the property in question. On June 26, 1945, a permit to
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erect a service station was obtained. The title of the
property was not taken by the plaintiff until March 15,
1946. On M~rch 12, 1946, the defendant, by resolution,
placed a 30-day time limit for the cornmencement of
work under a building permit and by resolution on June
2, 1946, an ordinance was adopted precluding the erection
of service stations in the area. After the cancellation of
the permit the plaintiff commenced excavation and grading which work was stopped and he thereafter brought
this action to review the resolution of the board in revoking his permit. The court held that the city had the
power to change the ordinance in the interest of the publice and to fix a time in which work must be commenced,
and put aside the claim of the plaintiff that it had a
vested right having acted on the faith of the perrnit and
had expended large sums of money by reason thereof.
In Vincent Petroleum v. Culver City, (1941) 111 P
(2) 433, plaintiff obtained a permit to drill for oil and
spent approximately $68,000.00. Its permit was renewed
a number of times, the last time on the condition that the
well be placed on a commercial production basis by Mav
30, 1937. The plaintiff failed to do this and the permit
was cancelled, which action was upheld.
In the case State v. Turgeon, Ohio, (1947) 77 NE
(2) 283, the owner secured a permit but did not commence
work in 6 months as required by the permit so the Mayor
revoked it as the ordinance authorized. The defendant
made application for a new permit which was refused on
the grounds that a new ordinance had been enacted making the use sought by the permit non-conforming. Mandamus for the issuance of the permit was denied.
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In the case Colonial Beacon Oil Company v. Finn,
283 N.Y.S. 384 {1935), fron1 a peremptory order of Inandamus directing the issuance of a permit for the erection of petroleum tanks, the defendant's appeal. Ordered
reversed and application dismissed. The city ordinance
required that before any permit be issued, complete plans
must be submitted to the Bureau of Buildings and approved by the superintendent. A further ordinance regulates the construction and installation of tanks or storage of petroleum products with requirements as to kinds
and sizes of material, manner of construction, capacity,
and location. The building superintendent issued a telnporary permit which was cancelled when the plans filed
showed non-compliance with the minimum distance requirements of the ordinance. The holder of the permit,
by failing to comply with the conditions of the ordinance
made the cancellation of the permit by the building superintendent in order.
::::0

The permit issued the Appellant June 7, 1945, expired and became void by reason of the Appellant suspending work for n1ore than 60 days. The Appellant also
lost his right to recommence work under the building
code, (Exh. H) by suspension and abandoning work exceeding one year and by changing the original plans and
specifications in his second application for a permit October 13, 1948. The Appellant evidenced his abandonment of the first permit as found by the court in its Conclusions by making application for a permit for a different use, that is a service station in place of a station and
store as first set out in the first application and permit by
prescribing a different sized building estimated cost at
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$8,000.00 in place of $3,000.00 and by paying the full fee
on the second permit which carries no indication that it
was a renewal of the first permit.
RESPONDENTS' POINT C.
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE
A PERMANENT WRIT OF INJUNCTION AS PRAYED AND ORDERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
The Appellant having lost all rights under the first
permit by his failure to meet the conditions therein fixed,
and that permit being, therefore, void, further construction would be without a permit and for a non-conforming
use.
The second permit having been issued without authority is a nullity and Appellant could do no further
construction under it. See 6 ALR (2) 960. Rights of permittee under illegally issued building permit.
Respondents are entitled to have the intended construction halted and Ordinance No. 246 observed and a
permanent injuction issued. The respondents will suffer
special damage by erection of a service station, (Fdgs.
Par. 1) and are entitled to maintain this action seeking
an injuction.
See Cassel v. Mayor, 73 A (2) 486. "Court of Equity
has jurisdiction to grant injuctive relief against the violation of zoning ordinances on the complaint of an in-.
dividual sustaining special damage as a result of the
violation.''
See 54 ALR 361.
Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Company, 138 A 483,
Connecticut, (1927).
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Respectfully sub1nitted,

GLENN W. ADAl\fS
LEWIS J. WALLACE
512 Eccles Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents

-25Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

